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Attorney John B. Glynn
Direct: (781) 356-1399 ext. 11
Fax: (781) 356-3393
Email: john.glynn@glhrlaw.com
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CIVIL |
CRIMINAL/PROBATE |
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Liquor Liability |
Superior Court Felonies/Misdemeanors |
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Construction Site Accidents |
District Court Felonies/Misdemeanors |
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Legal Malpractice |
M.G.L. C.209A Complaints/Violations |
| Business Litigation |
Divorce, Modification |
| Real Estate Litigation |
Child Custody |
| Automobile |
Estate/Trust Litigation |
| Construction Defects |
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| (Commercial/Residential) |
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TRIAL
EXPERIENCE - CIVIL
Practice consists of representation of
individual and corporate clients as plaintiffs and defendants.
75-80% of trial
work representing defendants
20-25% of trial
work representing plaintiffs
Clients included, but not limited to:
Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority
Insureds of First
State Management Group (subsidiary of The Hartford)
Insureds of
Arbella Mutual Insurance Company
Insureds of John
Hancock Insurance Company
Insureds of United
American Surety Company, Ltd.
TRIAL
EXPERIENCE – CRIMINAL
Attorney Glynn has and continues to represent
clients charged with criminal felonies and/or misdemeanors in both
Superior
and District Court. Historically, Attorney Glynn was an Assistant District
Attorney in Suffolk
County where he prosecuted criminal
offenses, including but not limited to first degree murder, rape, armed robbery,
drug cases, and also misdemeanors. As a criminal defense attorney for a period
of ten (10) years, Attorney Glynn was approved by the Committee for Public
Services to represent indigent defendants indicted for first degree murder.
PROBATE COURT
Attorney Glynn has represented clients in
divorce/modification and M.G.L. C.209A proceedings. Attorney Glynn has also
represented clients in estate/trust litigation in the Probate Court.
EDUCATIONAL /
PROFESSIONAL
PROFILE
Attorney Glynn is a 1970 graduate of Boston College with a B.S. in Accounting
and a 1975 graduate of Suffolk University Law School. Attorney Glynn has been
licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts since December
1975; he has also been admitted to the United States District Court (D.Mass) and
the United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
From February 1976 to June
1979, Attorney Glynn was an Assistant District Attorney in Suffolk County
prosecuting a variety of criminal cases ranging from simple misdemeanors to
first degree murder.
From June 1979 to December 1980, Attorney Glynn was an Assistant General Counsel
with the M.B.T.A. Law Department. Attorney Glynn was counsel on matters that
included defending tort cases, construction contract disputes, and assisting the
M.B.T.A. Police Department in internal investigations, including but not limited
to preparing Affidavits in Support of a Court-approved Warrant.
From December 1980 through August 1987, Attorney Glynn was a practitioner where
he actively practiced in both criminal and civil litigation. During this period
of time Attorney Glynn represented clients in District Court who had been
accused of assault and battery, operating under the influence of liquor,
unlawful carrying of firearms, various drug offenses. In Superior Court,
Attorney Glynn’s clients were charged with unarmed robbery, rape, kidnapping,
illegal drugs, and murder. For a period of ten years, Attorney Glynn was
approved to represent indigent criminal defendants who had been indicted for
first degree murder.
From 1987 to present, Attorney Glynn’s practice continued with trial work, with
a greater emphasis in civil litigation which included representing the M.B.T.A.
and representing the insureds of various insurance companies. These matters
included legal malpractice defense, liquor liability (dram shop), construction
site accidents, general liability, and automobile defense. He also represents
plaintiffs in personal injury cases, both at trial and/or in pursuing a claim.
Attorney Glynn will represent clients in real estate transactions, as well as
provide his clients with basic estate planning, such as Wills, Durable Powers of
Attorney, and Health Care Proxies.
Attorney Glynn has also been approved as a Certified Mediator under M.G.L.
Chapter 233, Section 23. Additionally, he is also available to serve as an
Arbitrator. For more information as to Attorney Glynn’s services as a
Mediator/Arbitrator, please go to Attorney Glynn’s mediation website,
www.glynnmediation.com.
Boards/Committees:
Board of Directors, United Casualty and Surety Insurance Company, February 2006 - Present
Audit Committee, United Casualty and Surety Insurance Company, February 2006 - Present
Board of Public Accountancy,
member-at-large, December 2005 – December 2006
Bar Association Memberships:
Massachusetts Bar Association
Boston Bar Association
Norfolk County Bar Association
Plymouth County Bar
Association
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys
Reported Cases:
David J. Spellman, Sr. et al v.
Shawmut Woodwork & Supply, Inc. d/b/a Shawmut Design & Construction v. East
Coast Fireproofing, Inc.,. 445 Mass. 675, 840 N.E. 2d 47 (2006)
Issues of this Supreme Judicial Court decision focused upon assignment,
indemnification and/or contribution. Furthermore, there were issues addressing
Workers Compensation, exclusivity provision, M.G.L. c 152 § 23. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court, in responding to Special Questions presented to it
by the Trial Court, revisited the earlier decision Campion v. Wilson, 422 Mass.
185, 51 N.E. 2d 68 (1996) and re-emphasized the importance that any agreements
for judgment should be absent of collusion and fraud. This Supreme Judicial
Court decision was very important for sub-contractors and the Associated
Sub-Contractors of Massachusetts submitted an amicus curiae brief. The Supreme
Judicial Court stated that a General Contractor who assigned its indemnification
rights to a Plaintiff in return for an Agreement for Judgment and a further
agreement not to execute on that judgment would not allow a Plaintiff to be
exempt from all of their evidentiary burdens against the General Contractor who
had been released. The Plaintiff was still required to establish liability and
damages against the General Contractor. The Plaintiff as assignee could then
pursue indemnification through the assignment against the Third Party Defendant
and Sub-Contractor, East Coast Fireproofing, Inc.
Missett v. Cardinal Cushing High School, 43 Mass. Appeals Court 5 (1997)
Case was noted not only in Massachusetts but also in other jurisdictions.
Missett, the primary Plaintiff, was stabbed at a high school dance in 1990 and
had alleged negligent security against Cardinal Cushing High School and the
Archdiocese of Boston for failure to maintain a safe premise. The high school,
through the Student Counsel with a faculty Moderator, hired a police detail; the
detail did not appear as agreed to and the high school decided to proceed with
the dance which resulted in the stabbing of Mr. Missett. A favorable verdict was
returned by a jury and the Trial Court ruled that M.G.L. C.231 §85K did not
apply since the revenues realized from the dance could be used for any purpose
by the Student Council who managed and sponsored the dance. The Appeals Court
made a very broad interpretation of M.G.L. C.231 §85K and reversed the Trial
Court’s decision stating that the dance was considered to be an event within the
educational purpose of the Statute; therefore, M.G.L. C.231 §85K applied. It
should be noted that the Courts had historically encouraged a literal and
dogmatic interpretation primarily on medical malpractice cases, yet the Appeals
Court in assessing the Trial Court ruling and the applicability of M.G.L. C.231
§85K made a very broad interpretation of the Statute.
Commonwealth v. Guttierez, 26 Mass. Appeals Court 42 (1988)
Constitutionality of a search of the Defendant at an airport. Defendant
Guttierez filed a Motion to Suppress the warrantless search based upon
observations made by State Police Detectives. Although cocaine was found on the
person, in the Defendant’s pants, the Trial Court suppressed the search; the
Commonwealth appealed. The Appeals Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision,
suppressing the search.
Commonwealth v. Almeida, 373 Mass.
266 (1977)
The Supreme Judicial Court’s decision on the constitutionality of a warrantless
search of an automobile made by a Boston Police Officer who made certain
observations of the Defendant while sitting in an automobile, lights out and
engine running, in a high crime rate area. The Police Officer became suspicious
during the threshold inquiry and search which resulted in the discovery of a
loaded firearm in the console of the automobile and the Defendant was placed
under arrest. The Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress in the Trial Court;
Motion to Suppress was denied. An Interlocutory Appeal was taken; the Petition
was allowed and the matter was referred to a hearing before the Supreme Judicial
Court, full bench. At the time, Attorney Glynn was an Assistant District
Attorney representing the Commonwealth and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed
the Trial Court’s decision, citing amongst its reasons, the high crime rate area
where the threshold search was conducted.
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